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140 Laiv enforcement by EU authorities 
be identified with regard to the (shared) enforcement powers exercised by 
EASA and the NAAs in the MS. Moreover, no overarching accountability 
mechanism accounting for the 'sharedness' of the enforcement of the EU 
aviation safety legal framework could be identified. The current political 
accountability mechanisms regarding EASA as compared with the NAAs 
in the MS reflect slightly differently Bovens' three stages of account-
ability. Furthermore, assessing the extent to which they could result in 
accountability gaps is difficult. Arguably, potential or actual account-
ability gaps could be partly compensated for by alternative internal and 
external review mechanisms existing at EU and national levels, such as 
the accountability relationship between the EASA Executive Director 
and EASA MB, or the supervisory and instructions powers exercised over 
NAAs by their respective ministt"ies. 
More accountability, however, might not necessarily be the (only) way 
forward. In this respect, the argument could be made that the increas-
ing involvement of political bodies with regard to direct enforcement 
powers in the aviation safety area is not desirable, as it could jeopard-
ize the technical independence of EU and national safety agencies, and 
make enforcement of aviation safety standards in individual cases subject 
to unwarranted political interference. Accountability should be rather 
focused on policy choices, where the Agency is subject to scrutiny of the 
Commission and EASA MB, in particular regarding its work programme. 
The ultimate accountability is with the Executive Director of the Agency, 
who is appointed and can be dismissed by the MB. 
6. Complex procedures as hurdle to 
accountability: verticalization of 
pharmaceutical enforcement 
Merijn Chamon and Sabrina Wirtz 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The legislative framework of pharmaceuticals regulation in the internal 
market is foremost defined at EU level, with important areas subject 
to complete harmonization. In addition, even if most authorizations 
are granted by the national authorities, significant examples of direct 
administration may be noted, such as the centralized procedure for 
granting marketing authorizations wh~reb~ the Com~nission ~nd the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA), which itself draws its expertise from 
the Member States (MS), cooperate to grant a single EU authorization. 
Today, following the EMA's 20th anniversary in 2015, which coii~cided 
with the 50th anniversary of the first EU legislation on pharmaceuticals, 1 
the area in general is subject to significant Europeanization. As a result, it 
is an interesting area of regulation that illustrates how the verticalization 
of the enforcement of EU legislation can start very modestly. 
As will be shown, enforcement powers in our case study are predomi-
nantly shared, in the sense that the EU enforcement authority relies on 
the national authorities. However, a parallel enforcement power has been 
created with the Penalties Regulation which allows for EU level sanc-
tions.2 Moreover, the Urgent Union Procedure shows characteristics of 
subordinate enforcement. 3 In this enforcement structure, challenges to 
1 Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of 
provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action relating to 
proprietary medicinal products [1965] OJ 22/369. . 
2 Commission Regulation (EC) 658/2007 of 14 June 2007 concernmg finan-
cial penalties for infringement of certain obligations in connection with marketing 
authorizations granted under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 [2007] OJ L155/10. 
3 Directive 2001/83/EC of the Parliament and Council of 6 November 2001 
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Table 6.1 The Belgian and German pharmaceutical sectors 
Share in Share in Share in EU Share in Share in Share 
EU GDP EUpharma workforce EUpharma EUR&D in EU 
production workforce pharma 
R&D 
BE 2.3% 3.7% 1.8% 4.7% 3% 8% 
GER 15.3% 13% 15.8% 15.5% 26.7% 20% 
accountability mainly result from the complexity of the composite proce-
dures which have been put in place. 
1.1 The Belgian and German Authorities 
The two MS on which we will focus are Belgium and Germany since both 
countries have a strong pharmaceutical sector. Bringing together data 
from the annual European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (EFPIA) report and OECD statistics allows us to illustrate 
this with some key figures (Table 6.1).4 
While the figures for Germany show that the German part of the 
European pharmaceutical sector is roughly proportionate to Germany's 
position in the European economy, the figures for Belgium show that 
it has a 'disproportionately' large pharmaceutical sector. 5 Also, the 
institutional structure of pharmaceuticals regulation enforcement within 
Belgium and Germany makes these countries interesting case studies, as 
they responded differently to the increasing integration of national regula-
tors into a European network of pharmaceutical regulators. The Belgian 
Federal Agency for Medicines (FAMHP) was established in 2006,6 as an 
autonomous agency to allow these tasks to be performed more efficiently, 
under the assumption that an agency would be able to be integrated more 
on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (2001] OJ 
L3l1/67, art 107i(l ). 
4 See European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations, 
The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 2015; OECD Data retrieved from <https:// 
data.oecd.org/> accessed 22 August 2016. The figures in Table 6.1 result from own 
calculations based on the EFPIA and OECD data. 
5 In this paragraph, 'European' does not mean 'EU' since some EFPIA (asso-
ciated) members are non EU-countries. 
6 Law of 20 July 2006 on the establishment and functioning of the Federal 
Agency for Medicines and Health Products, Belgisch Staatsbald/Moniteur beige 8 
September 2006, p.45714. 
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easily into the European network.7 In contrast, the German government's 
proposal to turn the ederal In titute for Drugs aud Medical Devices 
(BfArM) into an ageucy,8 to make it more competitive in the European 
context,9 failed and the BfArM remained a higher federal authority under 
the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Health. 10 
t.2 The Institutional Structure of the Enforcement of EU 
Pharmaceuticals Regulation 
The next sections provide short presentations of the relevant enforcers, 
including their tasks and institutional setup. 
t.2.1 The European Medicines Agency 
At the EU level, the EMA fulfils .an important role in the enforcement of 
pharmaceutical regulation, although, unlike the framework governing, for 
example, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), 11 it will gener-
ally be the Commission that adopts final binding decisions. The EMA 
was established in 1993, 12 to infuse the EU decision-making process with 
independent scientific and technical expertise. 13 Its creation built on 30 
7 See the Report of the Committee on the legislative proposal establishing a 
Federal Agency for Medicines and Health Products, Chamber of Representatives, 
2005-2006, 19 May 2006, nr. 2437/003, 3-4. 
8 Gesetzentwwf der Bundesregierung, Entwwf eines Gesetztes zur 
Errichtung einer Deutschen Arzneimittel-und Medizinprodukte Agentur (DAMA-
Errichtungsgesetz), 23 February 2007, 16/4374. 
9 Bundesministerium fur Gesundheit, Press Release: Wettbewerbsfahige 
Arzneimittelzulassung bringt mehr Sicherheit beiArzneimitteln und Medizinprodukten 
und starkt den Wirtschaftsstandort, 1 March 2007. 
10 See also: R Kurth, 'Die Entwicklung des Bundesinstituts for Arzneimittel 
und Medizinprodukte (BfArM) im zunehmenden europaischen Wettbewerb' 
(2008) 51 Bundesgesundheitsblatt - Gesundheitsforschung - Gesundheitsschutz 
340, 340-44. 
11 See Chapter 5, this volume. 
12 The EMA was created through Council Regulation (EEC) 2309/93 of 22 
July 1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and super-
vision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establi hing a 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products [1993] OJ L214/I . This 
CouncjJ Regulation wa replaced by Regulation (EC) 726/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Cow1ci l of 31 March 2004 laying down ommunity proce-
dures for U1e auU1ori alion and upervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency (2004] OJ L 136/1, 
which now regulates the mandate and functioning of the EMA. 
13 The description 'non-majorilarian agencies' is used to refer to the fact that, 
although carrying out a public function, these bodies are independent from elected 
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years of prior EU pharmaceuticals legislation, as the Agency integrated 
pre-existing comitology committees. 14 
General tasks EMA's general task consists in advising the MS and the 
EU institutions on the quality, safety and efficacy of medicinal prod-
ucts.15 Its primary task is to provide scientific advice to the Commission 
in the centralized marketing authorization procedure. Over the years, 
the EMA has also obtained a mandate to coordinate pharmacovigilance 
measures, which are concerned with gathering data about adverse effects 
of pharmaceuticals, after their marketing authorization, and addressing 
them. 16 In this regard, pharmacovigilance is an important part of the 
regulatory framework: no matter how carefully medicines are assessed 
at the authorization stage, adverse drug reactions might occur once the 
product is marketed and accessible to a larger group of patients. 
General institutional setup The EMA, like the EASA, European 
Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) and the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), 17 is a decentralized agency of the EU and 
enjoys legal personality under its founding regulation. 18 The EMA 
is headed by an Executive Director and governed by a Management 
Board, and further consists of seven scientific committees and a 
secretariat charged with the technical, scientific and administrative 
support of the committees. 19 The Management Board of the EMA 
is composed of one representative of each MS, two representatives of 
each of the Commission and the Parliament, as well as four stakeholder 
represen ta ti ves. 20 
The Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) forms 
the main scientific committee for evaluating medicines for humans. Next to 
the CHMP, six other specialized committees such as the Pharmacovigilance 
politicians. See: D Curtin, 'Delegation to EU Non-Majoritarian Agencies and 
Emerging Practices of Public Accountability' in D Gerardin, R Munoz and N Petit 
(eds), Regulation Through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European 
Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing 2006) 92. 
14 See also M Groenleer, The Autonomy of European Union Agencies - A com-
parative study of institutional developments (Eburon 2009) 145. 
15 Reg 726/2004, art 57(1). 
16 Ibid., art 57(1)(c)-(f). 
17 For EASA see Chapter 5, this volume; for EFCA see Chapter 7, this volume; 
and for ESMA see Chapter 3, this volume. 
18 Ibid., art 71. 
19 Ibid., art 56. 
20 Ibid., art 65. 
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Risk Assessment Committee (PRAC) provide scientific advice.21 The large 
majority of the committee members are representatives of the national 
competent authorities and are appointed by the MS, after consultation 
with the agency's Management Board.22 The total number of agency staff, 
including trainees and national experts, exceeded 800 in 2014. 23 In 2015 
the EMA operated on a budget of€302 million of which only some 11 per 
cent came from the general EU budget. 24 Furthermore, the agency brings 
together and coordinates the national agencies tasked with the authoriza-
tion of pharmaceuticals, making the EMA the centre of a large regulatory 
network of national regulatory authorities. 25 
1.2.2 The nationa1 authorities 
General tasks The general objective of both the F AMHP and BfArM is 
to ensure the safety and efficacy of medicines and medical devices.26 They 
decide, inter alia, on requests for marketing authorisations; implement the 
pharmacovigilance system; monitor the manufacturing and distribution of 
medicines and assist the government by proposing new legislation and by 
enforcing existing relevant legislation. 
General institutional setup The F AMHP has been established as a type 
A agency as envisaged in the law of 16 March 1954.27 This means that 
it is a functionally decentralized agency with a separate legal personality 
functioning under the hierarchic authority of its parent Minister. Despite 
its own legal personality, the FAMHP acts in the name and on behalf of 
21 Ibid., art. 56. 
22 Ibid., art 61(1). 
23 EMA, Annual Report 2014, 64. 
24 See EMA, Annual Activity Report 2015, 76. This means that the EMA is 
mainly funded through fees charged to market operators. 
25 For further detail on the network character of the EMA see: R 
Dehousse, 'Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role 
of European Agencies', (1997) 4 Journal of European Public Policy 246-61; A 
Spina, 'The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals Beyond the State: EU and Global 
Administrative Systems' in E Chiti and B Mattarella, Global Administrative Law 
and EU Administrative Law (Springer 2011) 249-68. 
26 Law of 20 July 2006, Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur beige, 8 September 
2006, p.45714; Law on the succeeding institutions for the Federal Health Office, 
24.06.1994, BOB!. I p.1416, para 1(3); Medicinal Products Act, 24.08.1976, BgBI. 
I, p. 3394, para 62 jo. 77. 
27 Law of 16 March 1954 on the control of some public interest entities, 
Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur beige, 24 March 1954, p. 2210. 
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the State.28 The FAMHP is headed by the Administrator General, who 
is appointed by the government for a six-year renewable term and who 
may act as the representative of the Minister of Public Health (allowing 
the Administrator General to e.g. , grant marketing authorizations). Apart 
from the supporting services, the F AMHP consists of three main policy 
divisions: DG pre-authorization, DG post-authorization and DG inspec-
tion. The FAMHP's total staff numbers about 400, mainly people with a 
scientific background. 
The BfArM is established as an independent higher federal authority 
within the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Health. The basis for the 
establishment of such higher federal authorities is Article 87 (3, lst sentence) 
of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). The BfArM does not have its 
own legal personality but is immediately subordinated to the Federal 
Ministry of Health. It is strictly limited to the tasks mandated by law or 
given to it by the ministry.29 The BfArM is headed by a President who, as 
a civil servant, is in principle appointed for life by the Federal President. 30 
The candidate is appointed on the proposal of the Minister of Health, 
subject to the approval of the federal cabinet. 31 The President oversees the 
working of currently more than 1,000 employees,32 of whom more than 
50% are working in the marketing authorization ofphannaceuticals. 33 
2. ENFORCEMENT IN THE REGULATION OF 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
In line with the rule of indirect administration of EU law, EU authori-
ties hold few direct enforcement powers in the area of pharmaceuticals. 
However, as the field is being progressively regulated at the EU level, 
several instances of a verticalization of enforcement may be noted. 
Looking at the issue from the perspective of the three stages of enforce-
ment, the current framework envisages a coordinating role for the EMA 
in monitoring and investigating, which will therefore still be done by the 
2s Law of 20 July 2006, art 4, para 2. 
29 Law on the succeeding institutions for the Federal Health Office, para 4. 
3D Federal Civil Servants Act, 05.02.2009, BgBI. I, p.160, para 10 jo. 12; see 
also Kurth (n 10) 343. 
31 See <http://www. bmg. bund.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/2014-03/neuer-prae 
sident-des-bfarm.htrnl> accessed 10 October 2016. 
32 See <http://www.bfarm.de/DE/BfArM/_node.html> accessed 22 August 
2016. 
33 Kurth (n 10) 340. 
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national authorities. Sanctioning as well is a prerogative of the national 
authorities, albeit that two interesting sanctioning powers are also given to 
EMA and the Commission. The complex procedures set up to this end are 
subsidiarity-inspired: while in the protection and improvement of human 
health the EU can only act in a supporting capacity (according to art 
6(a) TFEU), the harmonization of pharmaceutical policy is based on the 
shared competence of regulating the internal market (art 4(2)(a) TFEU) 
and the shared competence for common safety concerns in public health 
matters as provided for in the Treaties (art 4(2)(k) TFEU). 
In what follows, we will first look at the general enforcement powers 
and tasks of the national authorities , consisting of inspections and 
sanctioning of infringements. Following this we will examine the verti-
calization of enforcement, illustrating this with two specific instances of 
enforcement: the imposition of a penalty under Regulation 658/2007 (the 
Penalties Regulation) and the use of the Urgent Union Procedure under 
Article 107i of Directive 2001/83. 
2.1 General Enforcement Powers: Inspections and Sanctioning Through 
National Authorities 
While the rule of indirect administration of EU law leaves it to the MS 
to implement, and thus also enforce, EU legislation, EU law may still set 
certain minimum requirements or a framework within which the MS are 
to take the 'appropriate measure[s], general or particular, to ensure fulfil-
ment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the 
acts of the institutions of the Union'. 34 Thus, both the Regulation estab-
lishing the EMA as well as Directive 2001/83 instruct the MS to ensure 
that effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions are put in place 
for infringements of the provisions of the Regulation or the Directive.35 
Further, title XI of the Directive sets out the rules on supervision and sanc-
tions and requires the MS to put in place a system whereby the national 
competent authorities have far-reaching supervisory powers. Supervising 
compliance of the Regulation is also entrusted to the national authori-
ties, with Articles 19 and 20 cross-referencing to title XI of the Directive, 
thereby ensuring that national authorities have the same tools at their 
disposal for supervising compliance with both the Directive and the 
34 See TEU, art 4. 
35 See Directive 2001/83 of the Parliament and Council of 6 November 2001 
on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use [2001] OJ 
L311/67, art l 18a; Regulation 726/2004 [2004] OJ L 136/1. 
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Regulation. Generally, because of this EU framework, the accountability 
for these enforcement tasks should not be limited to actors at the national 
level but also extend to the EU level when enforcement practices have an 
EU dimension. 
2.1.1 Inspections 
Article 111 of Directive 2001/83 requires the MS to enforce the pharmaceu-
tical Jaws through inspections, which are to be carried out unannounced if 
necessary, while information on both planned and performed inspections 
are to be shared with the Agency. These inspections, according to Article 
11 la of the Directive, are subject to common principles, which are defined 
by guidelines adopted by the Commission. In this regard, the German 
Medicinal Products Act, for example, makes it clear that the inspections 
have to be carried out in accordance with these guidelines.36 The inspec-
tion powers of the competent authorities are thus clearly embedded in a 
EU context. Even more so, the EMA coordinates inspections requested 
by the CHMP with regard to centrally authorized products and also 
organizes regular meetings between national inspectors, for example in 
the framework of the Good Clinical Practice Inspectors Working Group 
or the Pharmacovigilance Inspectors Working Group, where common 
inspection guidelines are drafted. 
The applicable legislation in both countries requires the authorities 
to cooperate with the EMA and other national authorities, sharing 
information on inspections and organizing inspections at the request 
of the Commission, the EMA or another Member State. 37 What is then 
shared in this inspection power (both at the monitoring as well as at the 
investigating stage) is that the national authorities remain the 'boots 
on the ground', whereas the overarching approach is rather informally 
settled at the EU level. In this sense the EMA differs from bodies like 
OLAF and EASA, because it does not have autonomous investigative 
powers. While the specific inspection acts may therefore still be scruti-
nized at national level, this may be cumbersome for the coordinating 
activities at the EU level. Here accountability will be straightforward 
36 Medicinal Products Act, para 64(3b). While a similar explicit reference for 
the conduct of inspections is not taken up in Belgian legislation, the explanatory 
memorandum of the relevant Royal Decree does indicate (generally) that the 
guidelines interpret the Directive for the purpose of its implementation. See the 
Royal Decree of 14 December 2006 concerning medicines for human and veteri-
nary use, Belgisch Staatsblad!Moniteur beige, 22 December 2006, p. 74016. 
37 Law of 25 March 1964, art 14ter; Medicinal Products Act, para 64(3b) and 
(3c). 
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if an inspection has been performed following a formal request by the 
EMA (as illustrated by the Roche case, see Section 3.4.2 below), but 
ensuring political and judicial accountability will be more problematic 
if one is confronted with an informal agreement between national 
authorities coming together within the EMA to agree on a plan of action 
for ongoing inspections. For such agreements the EMA would be the 
wrong actor to hold to account, while relying on national accountability 
mechanisms would be ineffective. 
Inspection powers of the national authorities In Belgium, one of the 
FAMHP's tasks is to monitor, enforce and ensure the application of a 
number of laws, including the law of 25 March 1964 on medicines. This 
law entrusts its enforcement to the employees of the FAMHP. 
In Germany, the enforcemenLof the Medicinal Products Act is gener-
ally entrusted to the federal states (Bundesliinder). 38 • However, where 
the Medicinal Products Act specifically provides it, a competent higher 
federal authority, such as the BfArM, is also granted enforcement powers. 
This division of tasks is further clarified in a general administrative 
instruction. 39 
The specific enforcement powers, which the national functionaries may 
exercise during inspections, are fairly similar in Belgium and Germany.40 
In both countries, the authorities mandated to carry out inspections are 
entitled to enter and inspect premises during normal business hours. These 
inspections may be unannounced. During the inspections, the officials are 
entitled to request information from persons and to request documents in 
any form, which includes the right to make copies of such documents or 
data. Moreover, these inspections may be documented through audio or 
video recordings. A difference exists between the protection of residential 
premises, as in Belgium an inspection of inhabited premises requires prior 
permission from the police court (the court dealing with minor and traffic 
offences) regardless of when an inspection is performed. In Germany, the 
inspections might be extended to residential housing in a case of imminent 
38 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 23.05.1949, BGBI. III, 
100-1, art 83; Medicinal Products Act, para 64. 
39 General Administrative Regulation on the Execution of the Medicinal 
Products Act, 29.03.2009, BAnz., p. 2287. 
40 Law of 25 March 1964, art 14, para 2, 2°; Medicinal Products Act, para 
64(4). In Belgium, other investigative measures are not envisaged and would 
therefore require the intervention of an investigating judge who may allow such 
measures to be taken by the judicial police at the request of the public prosecutor. 
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danger to public order and security and the Medicinal Products Act in this 
case does not require the authorization of a court.41 
In Belgium, the FAMHP's functionaries are empowered to issue warn-
ings to offenders, to impose deadlines for compliance and to draw up 
authenticated accounts which have conclusive force but which may be 
rebutted.42 These proces-verbaux may also be used by other civil servants 
and services entrusted with the enforcement of different laws.43 If neces-
sary, the FAMHP's functionaries may be assisted by police officers.44 
At the same time, the FAMHP's inspectors can also assist the judicial 
police. In this regard, there is some useful clarification by the Court of 
Cassation of the Food Safety Agency's inspection powers (which are very 
similar to those of the FAMHP): the agency's assistance is covered by 
the police search warrant and does not require a separate approval from 
the police court. At the same time the agency is not prevented during 
such an inspection from making discoveries of new facts which were 
not the subject of the original warrant. As long as the acts of the agency 
are covered by the original warrant, the right to a fair trial will not be 
violated. 45 
Following an inspection, both Belgian and German law provide that the 
inspected company is to be informed of the authority's findings and to be 
granted the opportunity to make remarks.46 Moreover, the German com-
petent authority may make provisional orders, including the closing of the 
premises, where this is necessary for the prevention of imminent danger to 
public order and safety.47 Where the authorities find infringements, they 
may issue directives to remedy any offences and to inhibit future offences, 
including the prevention of marketing of the concerned product, as well 
as recalling or seizing it.48 These measures are subject to administrative 
discretion with regard to whether or not they should be taken and with 
41 Medicinal Products Act, para 64(4). 
42 This is an exception to the general rule that proces-verbaux merely have 
informative value. See also Xirius-Altea, 'Article 14, § 3', in pharma.be, Codex 
Pharma Commente/Becommentarieerde Codex Pharma (Knopspublishing 2013) 
219. 
43 Law of 25 March 1964, art 14, para 3. 
44 Ibid., para 4. 
45 Cass. 30 October 2012, P.12.0330.N. Confirming the ruling of the Hof van 
Beroep Antwerpen (JOe Kamer), 11January2011, AR 2010PGA001836. 
46 Law of25 March 1964, art 14, para 6; Medicinal Products Act, para 64(3d). 
47 Medicinal Products Act, para 64(4); similarly for the Belgian authority, see 
Law of25 March 1964, art 14, para 2, 2°(e). 
48 Medicinal Products Act, para 69; Law of 25 March 1964, arts 8, 8bis and 
14, para 3. 
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regard to their content, subject to the principle of proportionality.49 In 
the case of products that have been authorized under the centralized 
EU procedure, the BfArM will inform the CHMP and will limit itself to 
measures urgently needed to protect public health, animal health or the 
environment, before the Commission has taken action. 50 
2.1.2 Sanctioning 
In both countries pharmaceutical legislation is enforced through criminal 
and administrative sanctions. 
In Belgium, infringements of some of the provisions of the law of 
25 March 1964 (and relevant European legislation including the EMA 
Regulation) are identified as punishable under criminal law. 51 For every 
infringement found, the FAMHP is instructed to send a proces-verbal 
to the public prosecutor, but the,F AMHP may also propose an admin-
istrative settlement which, if complied with, will normally result in the 
prosecution being withdrawn, unless the public prosecutor decides to 
pursue the prosecution. 52 According to commentators, this possibility of 
an out of court settlement explains the lack of any (documented) criminal 
convictions for infringements of the law of 25 March 1964. 53 In Germany, 
depending on which obligation under the Medicinal Products Act has 
been infringed, §95 and §96 of the Medicinal Products Act with regard 
to penal provisions or §97 with regard to administrative fines will apply. 
Where penal provisions are concerned, the case will be handed over to the 
competent public prosecutor. When exercising those powers, the national 
49 B Mainz-Kuhlmann, '§26 Pharmakovigilanz' in S Fuhrmann, B Klein and 
A Fleischfresser, Arzneimittelrecht (Nomos 2014) 711, Rn. 112-113. 
50 Medicinal Products Act, para 69(la). This applies to products authorized 
under Regulation 726/2004, within the framework of the recognition procedure 
under Chapter 4 of Directive 2001 /83 and on the basis of an expert opinion of the 
Committee provided for in Article 4 of Directive 87 /22/EEC of 22 December 1986 
prior to 1January1995. In relation to Belgium, see Law of25 March 1964, arts 8 
and 8bis. 
51 See Law of 25 March 1964, arts 16 and l 6bis. 
52 Law of 25 March 1964, art 17, para 1. See also Royal Decree of 23 January 
2002, Belgisch Staatsblad/Moniteur Beige, 23 February 2002, p. 7121. Before 2015, 
the acceptance of the settlement by the offender prevented further (criminal) pros-
ecution, but the Council of State (in its advisory capacity) suggested that the more 
independent public prosecutor should not be prevented by the administration from 
acting in the general interest. See Wetsontwerp houdende diverse bepalingen met 
betrekking tot medische hulpmiddelen, Chamber of Representatives, 2013-2014, 
9 October 2013, nrs. 53 3057/001and53 3058/001, pp.113-14. 
53 P Shawn Coulson, 'Article 17' in pharma.be Codex Pharma Commente/ 
Becommentarieerde Codex Pharma (Knopspublishing 2013) 236. 
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authorities work autonomously. As the two case studies in Section 2.2 
show, the European dimension to enforcement at the sanctioning stage 
instead results in a concurrent autonomous sanction:i11g power or in a 
superseding sanctioning power whereby the national authorities simply 
become the instruments of the European enforcement authority. 
2.2 Verticalization of Enforcement: the EU Authorities' Enforcement 
Powers in the Area of Pharmacovigilance 
The following sections will discuss the trend of an increasingly shared EU 
administration in the remit of phannacovigilance where the European 
regulatory framework has advanced from a culture of 'passive monitor-
ing to active surveillance'. 54 However, this should not be understood as 
meaning that the EMA has become the primary enforcement authority 
exercising autonomous powers in the three enforcement stages as, e.g., the 
ESMAdoes. 
To illu trate tbis point, two distinct procedures in the sanctioning stage 
will be di cu ed: the Urgent Union Procedure (UUP) and the procedure 
whereby the Commission may impose financial penalties on market 
authorization holders for non-compliance with Regulation 726/2004. 
These two illustrations have not been selected in a haphazard way: on the 
one hand, the UUP allows national market authorizations to be revoked, 
not by the originally competent national authority but through a Union 
procedure whereby the ultimate decision-making authority is vested in EU 
authorities. On the other hand, the Penalties Regulation aims to sanction 
infringements of the Regulation 726/2004, covering centrally authorized 
products, including infringements of pharmacovigilance obligations. As 
discussed above, infringements of the Regulation are normally sanctioned 
by the national authorities, but the Penalties Regulation creates an 
autonomous sanctioning power for the EU authorities. 
2.2.1 The Urgent Union Procedure 
The UUP is currently laid down in Articles 107i-l 07k of Directive 2001/83 
(see also Figure 6.1 below). 
The UUP is initiated by any Member State or the Commi sion in rela-
tion to any authorized medicinal product, where a Member State or the 
Commission, on the ba is of the evaluation of pharmacovigilauce data, 
54 EMA, Celebrating 20 years (2015) 52, available at <http://www.ema.europa. 
eu/doc /en_GB/docwnenUibrary/Brochure/2015/03/WCSOO 184383. pdf> accessed 
22 August 2016. 
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Opinion 
considers suspending or revoking a marketing authorization suspending 
the supply of a medicinal product, or refusing the renewal of a marketing 
authorization and/or is i11formed by a marketing authorization holder 
tl1at the marketing of a product ha been di continued due to safety 
concern .55 
The procedure applies to any medicinal product that has been author-
ized in the Union, irrespective of whether the marketit1g authorization 
wa gran ed tlu·ougb a national authority or through the centralized 
procedure.s6 Moreover, the procedure can cover whole therapeutic cla ses 
of products or groups of products with the ame active substance which 
means that nationally and centrally authorized products might be covered 
by the same procedure. 011ly where the medicinal product concerned 
SS Dir 2001/83, art L07i(l). 
56 In a ea e where only centrally authorized product are concerne-0, an 20 of 
Regulation 726/2004 will apply. 
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is authorized in only one MS, will the issue be handled by that MS 
autonomously. 57 
When the procedure is triggered, the PRAC in the EMA will look into 
the safety issue. 58 In the meantime, for nationally authorized products, 
the Commission may request the MS to take temporary measures,59 while 
for centrally authorized products the Commission may do so itself. 60 The 
PRAC will then make a recommendation on the matter within 60 days.61 
Where the PRAC is assessing the matter, the marketing authorization 
holder, the general public and health care professionals are allowed to 
submit comments in writing. 62 Moreover, the PRAC may request oral 
explanations, but the marketing authorization holder does not have a right 
to present oral explanations. 63 
Where the procedure only concerns nationally authorized products, 
the PRAC will adopt a recommendation for the Coordination Group 
for Mutual Recognition and Decentralized Procedures (CMDh). 64 If 
the latter by consensus comes to an agreement, the MS will each imple-
ment it accordingly. 65 If no agreement by consensus is reached, the 
Commission will adopt a decision pursuant to a comitology procedure.66 
As a result, an EU authority may be given the power to sanction a market 
player by deciding on the suspension or withdrawal of nationally granted 
authorizations. 
Moreover, as soon as at least one centrally authorized product is con-
cerned, the PRAC recommendation is transferred to the CHMP, which 
will adopt an opinion on the matter of maintenance, variation, suspension, 
57 Dir 2001/83, art 107i(l b). 
58 Ibid., art. 107j(2). 
59 Ibid., art. 107i(3). Under art 70quater, para 1 of the Royal Decree of 14 
December 2006, the Belgian Minister of Public Health (or the F AHMP) is required 
to immediately adopt any measure so requested by the European Commission. 
60 See Dir 2001/83, art 107i(3). 
61 Ibid. , art 107j(3). 
62 Ibid., art 107j(2); EMA, Questions and answers on Urgent Union Procedures 
(Article 107i of Directive 2001/83/EC), 3 March 2015, EMA/720443/2012 Rev. 
3, 8. 
63 Ibid., 15. 
64 See Dir 2001183, art 107j(3). The Coordination Group is not formally a 
part of the Agency. It is composed of one representative per Member State and 
the Commission as observer. The Secretariat to the CMDh is, however, provided 
by the EMA. 
65 Dir 2001/83, art 107k(2). 
66 Ibid. , art 107k(2) subsection 3. Under art 70ter, para 2 subs 3 the Belgian 
Minister of Public Health (or the F AHMP) is required to implement the 
Commission's decision. 
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revocation or non-renewal of the marketing authorization. 67 Based on 
this opinion, the Commission will instruct the MS in which the concerned 
products are authorized about the measures that should be taken, thereby 
using them a an extended arm. It will also adopt a decision on the specific 
centrally authorized products concerned. 68 
The resulting composite procedure is therefore quite complex. Whether 
the Commission adopts a decision at the end of an UUP depends on 
whether a centrally authorized product is part of the procedure and, where 
only nationally authorized products are concerned, on whether a consen-
sus is found in the Coordination Group. 
The verticalization of regulation with regard to the UUP is also reflected 
at the national level in Belgium and Germany. If an UUP is launched for a 
product that is only authorized in Belgium, the procedure will be directed 
by the Mini ter of Public Health.69 For products authorized in several MS, 
the EMA is recognized as the responsible authority70 and the relevant Royal 
Decree provides that the Minister of Public Health will immediately adopt 
those measures requested by the Europea11 Commission. 71 The German 
Medicinal Products Act in §63e also integrates the UUP, stating: 'With 
regard to the cases governed by Article 107i of Directive 2001/83/EC, the 
competent higher federal authority shall take the measures provided for 
therein. Articles 107i to 107k of Directive 2001/83/EC shall apply to the 
procedure.'72 In the case of a Commission decision, the BfArM will adopt 
measures under §30 1 a and 2a of the Medicinal Products Act. It is interesting 
in this regard that the right to object to such a decision within an administra-
tive preliminary procedure, as applicable in purely national procedures, does 
not apply to measures which the BfArM adopts on the basis of the UUP. 
2.2.2 The Penalties Regulation 
In the past, the sanctions available against marketing authorization 
holders with regard to the enforcement of pharmaceuticals at the EU level 
were limited to the revocation of or the imposition of variations on the 
marketing authorization. However, there was no possibility to sanction 
67 Dir 2001/83, art 107k(3). 
68 Ibid., art 107k(4). See also the Commission's justification for this instance 
ofverticalization, European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document 
SEC (2008) 2670 Vo! I, 33. 
69 Royal Decree of 14 December 2006, art 70bis. 
70 Ibid., art 70ter, para 1. 
71 Ibid., art 70quater, para 1. 
72 Medicinal Products Act, para 63e. Translation via: <http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_amg/> accessed 11 August 2016. 
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infringements of the legislation if these did not lead to a negative effect on 
the safety, quality or efficacy of the product.73 This has changed with the 
adoption of the Penalties Regulation. 
In post-Lisbon terminology, the Penalties Regulation is a delegated act 
adopted by the Commission, supplementing the basic Pharmaceuticals 
Regulation. 74 Its legal basis is Article 84 of the Pharmaceuticals 
Regulation which allows the Commission, following a proposal by the 
EMA, to impose financial penalties. Here EMA's powers are comparable 
to those of EASA which also (only) has the power to propose a sanction. 
The Pharmaceuticals Regulation further requires the Commission to 
make such decisions public. 
Further details are worked out in the Penalties Regulation which sets 
out a list of punishable infringements, including infringements of certain 
pharmacovigilance obligations. However, the application of the Penalties 
Regulation is limited to 'cases where the infringement concerned may 
have significant public health implications in the Union, or where it has 
a Union dimension by taking place or having its effects in more than one 
Member State, or where interests of the Union are involved'. 75 
The infringement procedure itself starts on the EMA's own initiative 
or at the request of the Commission or a Member State. Article 3 allows 
the EMA and the Commission to request the national authorities to 
collect information or perform inspections. The EMA will draw up a 
report for the Commission, which may decide to pursue the procedure 
by addressing a statement of objections to the market authorization 
holder concerned. The latter has a right to reply in writing and to 
defend its case orally. If the Commission concludes that the market 
authorization holder has committed an infringement, it may impose a 
fine not exceeding 5 per cent of the marketing authorizations holder's 
EU turnover in the previous business year or in the case of ongoing 
infringements daily penalty payments of 2.5 per cent of the holder's 
daily average EU turnover.76 I11 deciding on the amount of the penalty, 
73 P Bogaert, 'The New EC Financial Penalties Regime - a Bridge Too Far?' 
(2007/08) Life Science 47, 47. 
74 Note that since the Pharmaceuticals Regulation has not yet been amended 
to take into account the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty (arts 290 and 
291 TFEU), the Penalties Regulation has not been adopted as a formal delegated 
act, although it is one in nature. 
75 Commission Regulation 658/2007 of 14 June 2007 concerning financial 
penalties for infringement of certain obligations in connection with marketing 
authorisations granted under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 [2007] OJ L 155/10, 
art I. 
76 Ibid., art. 16. 
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the fines imposed at national level for the same infringements must be 
taken into account.77 The decision of the Commission to impose a fine 
is published (as are the reports by the EMA), which certainly contrib-
utes to a practice of 'naming and shaming' next to the actual financial 
consequences. 78 
3. ENSURING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOLLOWING THE 
VER TICALIZATION OF ENFORCEMENT 
Before commenting on the challenges to and deficits of the accountability 
regimes, those regimes will first be briefly presented in a general overview 
for the three authorities concerned. 
3.1 The European Medicines Agency 
As an EU decentralized agency, the EMA is primarily held accountable, 
both politically and judicially, by the EU institutions. The EMA's Director 
is accountable to the EMA Management Board. The accountability of the 
Board members is not regulated, but insofar as they represent the MS and 
the Commission, each depends on its principal. In contrast, the individual 
accountability of the members of the EMA's scientific committees is not 
set out in the regulation. 
As regards the EMA's judicial accountability, the Lisbon Treaty has 
rectified the most significant lacunae in legal protection by providing 
that the legal remedies envisaged in the Treaties also apply to the 'bodies, 
offices and agencies' of the EU, even if it still left some issues open, 79 
notably the question of the EU agencies' internal Boards of Appeal. 80 
However, given the unclear legal nature of the acts adopted by the EMA 
in the two cases in section 2.2, it seems doubtful whether these acts could 
be challenged before the EU courts. 
The EMA's accountability is first frustrated by the open-ended nature 
of the Agency's mandate, which focuses on process (stressing scientific 
77 Ibid., art 18(3). 
78 Bogaert (n 73) 48. 
79 For a discussion, see M Chamon, 'Les agences decentralisees et le droit pro-
cedural de l'UE' (2016) 52 Cahiers de droit Europeen, 541- 574. 
80 So far, the EMA, not being a genuine decision-making agency, has not been 
endowed with its own Board of Appeal; this is different from the EASA and from 
the ECB's Administrative Board of Review. 
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excellence) rather tha11 outcome (public health).81 Secondly, the EMA's 
political accountability is insufficiently worked out in its establishiJ1g 
act,82 if accountability i under tood a comprising the three stages of 
providrng information di cussing that information and the po sibility 
of rectification.83 While the Regulation requires the EMA to present au 
annual work programme and an alll.lual report on its functioning to the 
EU institution and MS, it does not make explicit how the report can 
be discussed. Formally, the only hearings (of the Director) before the 
Parliament take place during the appointment procedure.84 That being 
said, an informal practice of hearing before the Parliament does exist.SS 
This is different for the Council which, generally does not seem to concern 
itself with the actual functioning of EU agencies.s6 
In all, this means that there are no political accountability mechanisms spe-
cific to the EMA's enforcement tasks a11d also that the reporting obligations 
only partially cover the enforcement task of the EMA. The annual activity 
reports cover enforcement insofar as they contaiu a ection on inspections, in 
which the number ofh1spections carried out is stated and certain performance 
indicators such as the timely completion of the inspections within the allot-
ted timeframe are specified.87 In addition achievements of a more general 
managerial nature uch as making inspections more efficient through coop-
eration with third-country authorities, are covered.ss Thus, accountability 
for the inspection requests and coordfoation through the Agency ba ed 
on the reports is more managerial, rather than substantively providing an 
account of how the inspection are carried out. T11e annual reports do not 
cover sanction of the national authorities and the UUP and the u e of the 
Penalties Regulation are also not reported on which is partly explai11ed by 
the fact that the Penalties Regulation has not been fully used yet. 
The two maiJ1 elements that allow for rectification and sa11ctioning then 
are the di charge procedure and the revision of the legislative mandate.89 
81 See also Chapter 11. 
82 M Scholten, The Political Accountability of EU and US Independent 
Regulatory Agencies (Brill 2014) 434-5. 
83 See Chapter L, section 2.3. 
84 See EMA Regulation , art 64(1). 
85 See M Busuioc, European Agencies: Laiv and Practices of Accountability 
(OUP 2013) 104-5. 
86 Ibid., 120; M Chamon, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the 
Transformation of the EU Administration (OUP 2016) 319. 
87 EMA, Annual Activity Report 2015, 49ff. 
88 Ibid., 51 ff. 
89 Since the EMA Director can only be removed by the EMA Board, it is 
difficult to qualify it as an instrument to hold the EMA accountable, unless the 
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The latter is obviously cumbersome and requires an agreement between 
the three institutions, insulating the Agency from the risk of any real 
sanction. Under the budgetary procedure the Commission, acting as 
an account holder, may propose a lower subsidy for the Agency in its 
budgetary proposals. The Parliament, possibly following the opinion 
of the Court of Auditors, may refuse to or only conditionally grant the 
Agency a discharge. Where the Parliament discovers systemic govern-
ance problems within the EMA, it can use its budgetary powers to hold 
the Agency accountable. Indeed, the Parliament has used the budgetary 
discharge procedure to address non-budgetary issues,90 and it has not 
shied away from postponing the discharge to put pressure on the Agency, 
as it did with regard to the budgets of 2009 and 2010 due to concerns with 
regard to the independence of experts. 9 t Similarly, the Parliament could 
sanction the EMA for its enforcement activities by freezing specific budget 
appropriations. 
3.2 The Belgian Federal Agency for Medicines and Health Products 
Since the F AMHP is an administrative authority, its decisions are chal-
lengeable before the Council of State, with a possibility of interim relief 
before the Council of State (or the civil magistrate). Compensation for 
damage resulting from wrongful conduct by the F AMHP may likewise 
be sought before an ordinary judge. Judicial scrutiny of the FAMHP's 
enforcement powers is also possible by a criminal court judge, i.e., when 
the findings of the F AMHP's inspections are contested in criminal 
proceedings. 92 
Commission's proposal (to the EMA Board) to remove the Director is taken into 
account. 
9° For example, in the budgetary discharge procedure for the year 2014, the 
Parliament asked the Agency to ensure transparency with regard to clinical trials 
data. See: European Parliament Resolution of 28 April 2016 with observations 
forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementa-
tion of the budget of the European Medicines Agency for the financial year 2014 
(2015/2171 (DEC)). 
91 European Parliament Decision of 25 October 2011 on discharge in respect 
of the implementation of the budget of the European Medicines Agency for the 
financial year 2009 [2011] OJ L3l3/27; European Parliament Decision of 10 May 
2012 on di charge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European 
Medicines Agency for the financial year 2010 [2012] OJ L350/82. 
92 Further, the Belgian Constitutional Court has ruled that the enforcement 
of competition rules is sufficiently comparable to criminal investigations, meaning 
that the same level of protection as that applicable in criminal proceedings should 
be afforded to undertakings faced with enforcement actions. Since the F AMHP's 
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Each year, the FAMHP is required to send a report to the Parliament 
and the parent Minister on its functioning. 93 Other than this, no direct 
parliamentary control is provided which may be explained by the fact 
that the F AMHP is not an independent agency but remains under the 
hierarchic authority of the Minister of Public Health. As a result, direct 
parliamentary control was not considered necessary and de Jure the 
system of accountability is watertight. However, it may be more of a 
legal fiction than reality to claim that the government (or Minister) may 
be held accountable for the activities of a functionally decentralized body 
such as the FAMHP. As regards financial independence, the FAMHP 
depends for 25 per cent of its budget on a grant from the government, 
whilst the rest of its income is generated by charges and fees paid by 
companies. 
3.3 The German Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices 
As part of the administration, the BfArM is subject to the general princi-
ple of Article 19(4) of the Grundgesetz which provides a right to judicial 
review for any act of a public institution that limits the rights of a person. 
This judicial review of administrative acts is exercised by administrative 
courts, with the possibility of an appeal to an administrative appeal 
court ( Oberverwaltungsgericht) and the Federal Administrative Court 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht). 94 With regard to administrative acts, which 
are decisions with binding effect in individual cases, the legal basis for an 
annulment action is §42 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure. 95 
In principle, purely factual acts are also subject to judicial review where 
they limit the individual right of a person. Taking the example of inspec-
tions, whether an inspection report can be legally challenged will depend 
on the legal basis of the inspection and the question whether the compe-
tent authority in the inspection report can make orders that would limit 
the rights of a person. For inspections carried out by the BfArM in the 
inspections are similar to those of the competition authority and may also result 
in administrative sanctions, the Constitutional Court's decision could be applied 
analogously to inspections by the FAMHP. See Belgian Constitutional Court, 22 
December 2011, 197/2011. 
93 The Law of 20 July 2006, art 9. In practice, the report is not discussed by the 
competent parliamentary committee. 
94 Code of Administrative Court Procedure, 21.01.1960, BGBI. I, p. 686, 
paras 40-53. 
95 Ibid., para 42. The administrative act is defined in Administrative Procedure 
Act, 25.05.1976, BGBI. I, p.102, para 35. 
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context of a marketing authorisation procedure, the judicial review of an 
inspection report was denied.96 
In addition, the BfArM, although nominally independent, is subject 
to full ministerial oversight through the Federal Ministry of Health, 
which encompasses both a legal oversight over the legality of BfArM's 
activities, as well as functional oversight, which applies to all aspects of 
the administrative tasks, allowing the Ministry to issue instructions with 
regard to policy implementation and decisions in individual cases. 97 
Insights from political science research suggest that the Ministry is quite 
reluctant to interfere with the content of BfArM's decisions; while the 
Ministry receives reports for example on the BfAr M acting as a rapporteur 
in European authorisation procedures, it refrains from interfering with 
the content of the reports and with the authorization in order to prevent 
ethical problems from arising. 98 , 
The Minister in turn is subject to parliamentary control, and parliamen-
tary questions concerning falsified studies and problematic manufacturers 
of pharmaceuticals in India show that the enforcement of pharmaceutical 
regulation can also become subject to parliamentary scrutiny; however, 
this is more likely in exceptional situations where a matter has caught 
media attention. 
Budgetary dependence on the ministry definitely provides for account-
ability, as the BfArM generates its incomes from fees that are determined 
by the ministry99 and through tax money allocated to the Federal Health 
Ministry in the Federal Budget. 
3.4 Challenges, Deficits and Risks Following the Verticalization 
of Enforcement 
As the UUP and the Penalties Regulation illustrate, the verticalisation of 
enforcement will often result in shared enforcement whereby enforcement 
96 VG Kain, Urteil vom 20. November 2012, Az. 7 K 703/11; OVG Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Beschluss vom 18. Dezember 2013, Az. 13 A 107113. 
97 M !bier, 'Artikel 87 GG' in T Maunz and G Durig (eds) Grundgesetz: 
Kommentar (Beck 2015, 76th Edition), paras 250-252; T Bach and W Jann, 
'Animals in the Administrative Zoo: Organizational Change and Agency 
Autonomy in Germany' (2010) 76 International Review of Administrative Science 
443. 
98 E Ruffing, 'Inside Regulatory Bureaucracy: When Europe Hits Home 
in Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals' (2015) Public Policy and Administration 15. 
Available at <http://ppa.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/12/04/095207671561699 
9> accessed 18 August 2016. 
99 Law on the succeeding institutions for the Federal Health Office, para 6(2). 
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tasks are performed by both national and EU authorities. This shared 
context means that the accountability mechanisms come under pressure, 
especially when enforcement tasks are shared in a non-exclusive way, 
several authorities being competent to take the same enforcement meas-
ures. These challenges and risks will be illustrated using the two examples 
of shared enforcement presented in section 2.2 above. 
While several authors point out that multi-level governance results 
in multiple account holders, JOO the risk seems to be that since there are 
many account holders, an agency is really held accountable by none. 
While we do not subscribe to any thesis claiming that accountability is 
impossible in a multi-level setting, it seems inevitable that such a setting 
makes things more complicated. In line with Brandsma, we find that 
accountability at the macro level depends on the aggregate of micro-level 
accountabilities. 101 This requires that the tasks and responsibilities of 
each different actor be precisely defined and that specific accountability 
mechanisms are put in place at the micro level. Moreover, while all three 
authorities studied are - at least to a certain extent - independent, all of 
them are subject to political and judicial accountability, the efficiency 
of which, however, depends on how the accountability mechanisms are 
being used. J02 
3.4.1 Which political accountability is best suited for enforcement in 
pharmacovigilance? 
The EMA's political accountability only being partially regulated in its 
establishing act and the fact that enforcement is not at the core of the 
Commission's and the EMA's mandates mean that political accountabil-
ity for enforcement actions is not really on the radar. While this may not 
be problematic today, since enforcement is only being verticalized on a 
modest scale, it might have to be addressed explicitly ifthe political choice 
is made to push verticalization through. 
In this respect, a supranational perspective on accountability, where the 
European Parliament is the primary actor for holding EU enforcement 
authorities to account, appears the most promising. After all, current 
practice reveals the Council's lack of interest in controlling EU agencies, 
100 See Y Papadopoulos, 'Accountability and Multi-level Governance: More 
Accountability, Less Democracy?', (2010) 5 West European Politics 1040-1041, 
and the authors cited there. 
JOI See G Brandsma, Controlling Comitology (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 
44-62. 
102 See M Scholten, 'Independent, Hence Unaccountable?' (2011) 4 Review of 
European Administrative Law 5. 
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while it is questionable whether the MS as such may appropriately hold an 
EU body to account, 103 reducing the prospects of the accountability mech-
anisms being founded on an intergovernmental approach. Alternatively, 
accountability mechanisms based on a regulatory regimes approach seem 
difficult to implement as long as the EMA is not a true regulatory agency. 
Like that of many EU agencies, its role is still limited in light of the Meroni 
doctrine. 104 
In the future the challenge posed by the composite nature of the 
enforcement procedures may require greater attention. In the two exam-
ples presented above, EU law is enforced in an integrated procedure, 
national and EU authorities all playing their part. When specific account-
ability mechanisms for enforcement are worked out, they should reflect 
this allocation of tasks. Still, even this would not be completely sufficient 
since, as already noted, the EMA actually draws its expertise from the 
MS. Using the UUP as an example: how could one hold .the EMA politi-
cally accountable for a PRAC recommendation, if the PRAC is mainly 
composed of MS' experts?105 While the European Parliament could 
address the EMA for information and discussion purposes, suprana-
tional rectification would seem to be out of place. Here a combination 
of an intergovernmental approach (national authorities being sanctioned 
in national accountability forums) and a regulatory regimes approach 
(self-correction by the epistemic community) would seem to be more 
appropriate. What at first sight appears to be a question purely related 
to accountability actually calls into question the very nature of the EU 
agency. 
3.4.2 Effective legal remedy against enforcement decisions 
Important challenges also arise in the judicial review of composite pro-
cedures, e.g., where national inspections are carried out at the request of 
the CHMP, which later lead to penalties imposed by the Commission. In 
general, preparatory measures like a CHMP request for an inspection or 
the CHMP opinion in the UUP are not subject to judicial review under EU 
law,J 06 unless they affect the legal sphere of the applicant autonomously, 
103 M Chamon, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the Tro11sformaLio11 
of the EU Administration (OUP 2016) 319, 327. 
JOJ Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority, BU:C: 1958:7. For in tance, the ECD j 
allowed to exercise significant powers in the Single Supervisory Mcchani m in the 
Banking Union precisely becau e Meroni's prohibition on ll1e exercise of di cre-
lionary power does noc apply Lo it. 
ios See EMA Regulation, art 61a. 
106 Case 60/81 I13M v. Commission EU:C: 1981 :264. 
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regardless of the final decision. 107 They can, however, be challenged in the 
context of a procedure against the final act. 108 
However, the sharing of inspection information between the national 
authorities and the EMA might also give rise to questions of national law, 
as exemplified by a claim brought by Roche against the UK Medicinal 
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). In this case, the 
EMA had asked the MHRA to perform inspections under the Penalties 
Regulation. Roche complained inter alia that it had not been properly 
informed and had been led to believe that it had been subject to a regular 
routine inspection. The EMA on the other hand claimed that national 
courts do not have jurisdiction in the first place to hear claims relating 
to infringements under the Penalties Regulation. 109 In this case the UK 
Court of Appeal ultimately decided that the information sharing between 
the MHRA and the EMA did not infringe the obligation of fairness and 
the principles applying to declaratory relief under English law, 110 but the 
diverging standards in individual protection against enforcement meas-
ures in the respective national and European frameworks might lead to 
gaps in accountability. 
This is exemplified by a case where the CHMP requested the 
inspection of a manufacturing site in India, which was carried out 
through a German authority. The inspection report documented several 
infringements of Good Manufacturing Practice, but denied the need 
to recall the products manufactured on the site. However, both the 
Commission, for several centrally authorized products, and the BfArM, 
for a purely nationally authorized product, ordered the company 
to recall the products. While the General Court and the Court of 
Justice upheld the Commission's decisions including the product recall 
for centrally authorized products at the EU level, 111 based on the 
Commission's wide discretion under the precautionary principle, 112 
107 Joined cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros 
Chemical v. Commission, EU:T:2007:287. 
108 See e.g. Joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, 
T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00 Artegodan GmbH e.a. v. Commission, EU:T: 
2002:283. 
109 See R (Roche) v. Secretary of State for Health [2014] EWHC 2256 [77]. 
I IO See R (Roche) v. Secretary of State for Health [2015] EWCA Civ 1311. 
111 Case T-539/10 Acino AG v. Commission, EU:T:2013:110; Case C-269/13 P 
Acino AG v. Commission, EU :C:2014:255. 
112 The ECJ confirmed in the Artegodan case that in taking enforcement 
decisions such as the withdrawal or variation of a marketing authorization the 
Commission has a large margin of discretion for actions under the precautionary 
principle. See Joined cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, 
Complex procedures as hurdle to accountability 165 
the German court came to the conclusion that the recall was not 
proportionate. 113 
The Penalties Regulation also shows the risks in verticalizing enforce-
ment powers in a non-exclusive way: if several authorities become com-
petent to sanction one and the same infringement, proper coordination 
between these authorities is essential. While the Penalties Regulation 
provides for administrative sanctions, they have a penal character which 
also explains why the Regulation instructs the Commission, when it 
imposes a fine, to 'take into account any penalties already imposed on the 
marketing authorization holder at national level on the basis of the same 
legal grounds and the same facts' .114 Since the Commission has, to date, 
not imposed any sanctions pursuant to the Penalties Regulation, 115 let 
alone sanctions concurrent with national sanctions, there is no practice to 
comment on. In any event, it should be clear that the Commission should 
do more than simply take into account prior penalties when it imposes new 
ones, lest it violate the principle of ne bis in idem. 116 
Finally, the complexity of the composite procedures resulting from a 
verticalization of enforcement may also frustrate effective judicial account-
ability. This is perfectly illustrated by the different possible outcomes of 
the UUP, described above. When only nationally authorized products are 
affected, the procedure does not necessarily culminate in an 'EU' deci-
sion. Whether this is the case depends on whether a consensus is reached 
in the Coordination Group for Mutual Recognition and Decentralised 
Procedures. Only if no consensus is reached, will the Commission adopt 
a decision challengeable before the General Court. In the alternative 
scenario, an affected manufacturer will have to seek legal remedies at 
the national level, since a private litigant will not be able to challenge 
the Coordination Group's consensus under Article 263 TFEU. 
T-137/00 and T-141/00 Artegodan GmbH e.a. v. Commission, EU:T:2002:283, paras 
181, 186, 201. 
113 VG Koln, Urteil vom 3. Dezember 2012, Az. 7 K 432111. 
114 See Reg 658/2007, art 18(3). 
115 The issue which made the EMA start a procedure under the Penalties 
Regulation against Roche (see EMA Press Release of 23 October 2012, 
EMA/666493/2012) was settled between Roche and the Commission before a 
penalty was imposed. 
116 Clearly, the same goes for the national authorities in the event that the 
Commission has already imposed a penalty. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Going back to the central question of this volume, it is clear that as 
far as enforcement in pharmacovigilance is concerned, the upgraded 
role of the EMA has not been accompanied by the creation of special 
accountability mechanisms. This should not really come as a surprise 
because the general accountability regime for the EMA is also far from 
sound: while the three stages of information, discussion and rectifica-
tion can all be identified, they are rather dissociated from, instead of 
integrated with, each other. This inter alia explains why, because of 
the lack of proper rectification mechanisms, the Parliament is using 
its budgetary powers vis-a-vis the agency in non-budgetary related 
matters. 
In addition, in Belgium and Germany, no specific accountability 
mechanisms have been introduced at the national level to accompany the 
specific enforcement tasks entrusted to the national authorities. However, 
since the national authorities formally act under the hierarchic authority 
of the government (unlike the EMA), the accountability regime in general 
is more robust (at least in theory), even if national parliaments do not 
seem to be particularly concerned with the functioning of the F AMHP 
and BfArM. 
Since the EMA's role in enforcement is still only very modest, it 
would seem premature to work out specific accountability mechanisms 
already. Here a wait-and-see approach seems more advisable, whereby 
lessons may also be learned from the experience gained from other EU 
enforcement authorities which have been assigned more significant 
enforcement tasks. The priority in regard to the EMA should instead 
focus on ameliorating two issues: first, the general accountability regime 
to which the EMA is subject, where the European Parliament should 
receive a greater formal role. As noted above, since the EMA is a EU 
authority, the focus should primarily lie on a supranational accountabil-
ity regime, possibly supplemented by intergovernmental and regulatory 
regime accountability mechanisms. Secondly, the procedures on shared 
enforcement could be simplified, which might also enhance the judicial 
review possibilities. 
When a simplification is contemplated, one should consider that 
the current complexity partially reflects a subsidiarity concern whereby 
national authorities are heavily involved in enforcement procedures. As 
a result, the solution for a simplification of the procedures does not lie 
in the wholesale transfer of enforcement powers to the EU level. Instead, 
the composite procedures should be embedded in a sound procedural 
framework, something for which the ReNEUAL model rules can act as a 
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standard. 117 The role of the EMA may also be upgraded (at the expense of 
the Commission) in line with the ECJ's more flexible interpretation, in the 
Short-selling or ESMA ruling, 118 of the Meroni doctrine. To compensate, a 
general hierarchic control of the Commission over the EMA could then 
be instated. 
117 See <http://www.reneual.eu/> accessed 11August2016. 
118 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:18 . 
